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OPINION 
______________ 
 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 
In 1982, the Republican National Committee (“RNC”) 
and the Democratic National Committee (“DNC”) entered 
into a consent decree (the “Decree” or “Consent Decree”), 
which is national in scope, limiting the RNC’s ability to 
engage or assist in voter fraud prevention unless the RNC 
obtains the court’s approval in advance.  The RNC appeals 
from a judgment of the United States District Court for the 
District of New Jersey denying, in part, the RNC’s Motion to 
Vacate or Modify the Consent Decree.1
                                                 
1 Judge Dickinson R. Debevoise, a United States District 
Judge, has presided over all district court proceedings 
regarding the Consent Decree at issue in this case, beginning 
with the 1981 lawsuit through the Motion to Vacate in 2009. 
  Although the District 
Court declined to vacate the Decree, it did make 
modifications to the Decree.  The RNC argues that the 
District Court abused its discretion by modifying the Decree 
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as it did and by declining to vacate the Decree.  For the 
following reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s 
judgment. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. 1981 Lawsuit and Consent Decree 
During the 1981 New Jersey gubernatorial election, 
the DNC, the New Jersey Democratic State Committee 
(“DSC”), Virginia L. Peggins, and Lynette Monroe brought 
an action against the RNC, the New Jersey Republican State 
Committee (“RSC”), John A. Kelly, Ronald Kaufman, and 
Alex Hurtado, alleging that the RNC and RSC targeted 
minority voters in an effort to intimidate them in violation of 
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (“VRA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 
1973, and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the 
Constitution of the United States.  The RNC allegedly created 
a voter challenge list by mailing sample ballots to individuals 
in precincts with a high percentage of racial or ethnic 
minority registered voters and, then, including individuals 
whose postcards were returned as undeliverable on a list of 
voters to challenge at the polls.  The RNC also allegedly 
enlisted the help of off-duty sheriffs and police officers to 
intimidate voters by standing at polling places in minority 
precincts during voting with “National Ballot Security Task 
Force” armbands.  Some of the officers allegedly wore 
firearms in a visible manner. 
To settle the lawsuit, the RNC and RSC entered into 
the Consent Decree at issue here.  The RNC and RSC agreed 
that they would: 
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[I]n the future, in all states and 
territories of the United States: 
(a) comply with all applicable 
state and federal laws protecting 
the rights of duly qualified 
citizens to vote for the 
candidate(s) of their choice; 
(b) in the event that they produce 
or place any signs which are part 
of ballot security activities, cause 
said signs to disclose that they are 
authorized or sponsored by the 
party committees and any other 
committees participating with the 
party committees;   
(c) refrain from giving any 
directions to or permitting their 
agents or employees to remove or 
deface any lawfully printed and 
placed campaign materials or 
signs; 
(d) refrain from giving any 
directions to or permitting their 
employees to campaign within 
restricted polling areas or to 
interrogate prospective voters as 
to their qualifications to vote prior 
to their entry to a polling place; 
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(e) refrain from undertaking any 
ballot security activities in polling 
places or election districts where 
the racial or ethnic composition of 
such districts is a factor in the 
decision to conduct, or the actual 
conduct of, such activities there 
and where a purpose or significant 
effect of such activities is to deter 
qualified voters from voting; and 
the conduct of such activities 
disproportionately in or directed 
toward districts that have a 
substantial proportion of racial or 
ethnic populations shall be 
considered relevant evidence of 
the existence of such a factor and 
purpose; 
(f) refrain from having private 
personnel deputized as law 
enforcement personnel in 
connection with ballot security 
activities. 
(App. at 401–02.)2
                                                 
2 The RNC agreed that the RNC, its agents, servants, and 
employees would be bound by the Decree, “whether acting 
directly or indirectly through other party committees.”  (Id. at 
402.)   
  The RNC also agreed to, “as a first resort, 
use established statutory procedures for challenging 
unqualified voters.”  (Id.)   
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B. 1987 Enforcement Action and Consent Decree 
Modifications 
In Louisiana during the 1986 Congressional elections, 
the RNC allegedly created a voter challenge list by mailing 
letters to African-American voters and, then, including 
individuals whose letters were returned as undeliverable on a 
list of voters to challenge.  A number of voters on the 
challenge list brought a suit against the RNC in Louisiana 
state court.  In response to a discovery request made in that 
suit, the RNC produced a memorandum in which its Midwest 
Political Director stated to its Southern Political Director that 
“this program will eliminate at least 60,000–80,000 folks 
from the rolls . . . If it’s a close race . . . which I’m assuming 
it is, this could keep the black vote down considerably.”  
Democratic Nat’l Comm.  v. Republican Nat’l Comm., 671 F. 
Supp. 2d 575, 580 (D.N.J. 2009) (citing Thomas Edsall, 
Ballot Security Effects Calculated: GOP Aide Said Louisiana 
Effort “Could Keep the Black Vote Down,” WASH. POST, 
OCT. 24, 1986 at A1.  Although the DNC was not a party to 
the action in Louisiana state court, it brought an action against 
the RNC for alleged violations of the Consent Decree after 
this memorandum was produced. 
The RNC and the DNC settled the lawsuit, this time by 
modifying the Consent Decree, which remained “in full force 
and effect.”  (App. at 404.)  In the 1982 Decree, the RNC had 
agreed to specific restrictions regarding its ability to engage 
in “ballot security activities,” but that Decree did not define 
the term “ballot security activities.”  (App. at 401.)  As 
modified in 1987, the Decree defined “ballot security 
activities” to mean “ballot integrity, ballot security or other 
efforts to prevent or remedy vote fraud.”  Democratic Nat’l 
Comm., 671 F. Supp. 2d at 581.  The modifications clarified 
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that the RNC “may deploy persons on election day to perform 
normal poll watch[ing] functions so long as such persons do 
not use or implement the results of any other ballot security 
effort, unless the other ballot security effort complies with the 
provisions of the Consent Order and applicable law and has 
been so determined by this Court.”  (App. at 405.)  The 
modifications also added a preclearance provision that 
prohibits the RNC from assisting or engaging in ballot 
security activities unless the RNC submits the program to the 
Court and to the DNC with 20 days’ notice and the Court 
determines that the program complies with the Consent 
Decree and applicable law.3
C. 1990 Enforcement Action 
   
                                                 
3 The modifications state that 
the RNC shall not engage in, and 
shall not assist or participate in, 
any ballot security program unless 
the program (including the 
method and timing of any 
challenges resulting from the 
program) has been determined by 
this Court to comply with the 
provisions of the Consent Order 
and applicable law.  Applications 
by the RNC for determination of 
ballot security programs by the 
Court shall be made following 20 
days[sic] notice to the DNC . . .    
(App. at 405.) 
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In 1990, the DNC brought a lawsuit alleging that the 
RNC violated the Consent Decree by participating in a North 
Carolina Republican Party (“NCRP”) program.  The DNC 
alleged that the RNC had violated the Decree in North 
Carolina by engaging in a program of the North Carolina 
Republican Party (“NCRP”) in which 150,000 postcards were 
sent to residents of predominantly African-American 
precincts.  This program allegedly attempted to intimidate 
voters by warning that it is a “federal crime . . . to knowingly 
give false information about your name, residence or period 
of residence to an election official.”  Democratic Nat’l 
Comm., 671 F. Supp. 2d at 581.  The postcards falsely stated 
that there was a 30-day minimum residency requirement prior 
to the election during which voters must have lived in the 
precinct in which they cast their ballot.   
The District Court found that the DNC failed to 
establish that the RNC conducted, participated in, or assisted 
in the postcard program.  However, the Court also found that 
the RNC violated the Consent Decree by failing to give the 
state parties guidance on unlawful practices under the 
Consent Decree or copies of the Decree when the RNC gave 
them ballot security instructional and informational materials.  
The Court held that the RNC must provide a copy of the 
Consent Decree, or information regarding unlawful practices 
under the Consent Decree, along with any such instructional 
or informational materials that the RNC distributes in the 
future to any state party. 
D. 2004 Enforcement Action (the “Malone enforcement 
action”) 
In 2004, the week before the general election for 
President, Ebony Malone (“Malone”), an African-American 
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resident of Ohio, brought an enforcement action against the 
RNC, alleging that the RNC had violated the Consent Decree 
by participating in the compilation of a predominantly-
minority voter challenge list of 35,000 individuals from Ohio.  
Malone’s name was on the list.  To compile the list, the RNC 
had sent a letter to registered voters in high minority 
concentration areas of Cleveland and the Ohio Republican 
Party sent a second mailing approximately a month later.  
Registered voters whose letters were returned as 
undeliverable were added to the challenge list.   
Seeking solace pursuant to the Decree, Malone sought 
before the District Court a preliminary injunction barring the 
RNC and any state organizations with which it was 
cooperating from using the list in ballot security efforts.   
On November 1, 2004, the DNC appeared before the 
District Court at an evidentiary hearing in support of Malone.  
The RNC argued that Malone’s suit was non-justiciable due 
to irregularities in her registration which would result in her 
being challenged by the Ohio Board of Election regardless of 
any separate challenge brought by the RNC.  The RNC also 
claimed that it had complied with the Decree and that the 
potential challenge to Malone voting was a “normal poll 
watch function[]” allowed by the Decree.  (App. at 405.)  
Finally, the RNC asserted that the Ohio Republican Party, 
which was not subject to the Decree, would carry out any 
challenge to Malone’s eligibility to vote. 
Following an evidentiary hearing, the District Court 
issued an Order barring the RNC from using the list to 
challenge voters and directing the RNC to instruct its agents 
in Ohio not to use the list for ballot security efforts.  The 
District Court rejected the RNC’s argument that Malone’s 
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claims were non-justiciable because she would suffer 
irreparable harm if she had to endure multiple challenges to 
her eligibility to vote.  The District Court found that the RNC 
had violated the procedural and substantive provisions of the 
Consent Decree by participating with the Ohio Republican 
Party in devising and implementing the ballot security 
program and failing to obtain preclearance for the program.   
The RNC requested that our Court stay the Order.  The 
panel denied the request for a stay and affirmed the District 
Court’s Order, noting that emails between the RNC and the 
Ohio Republican Party showed collaboration between the two 
organizations sufficient to support the District Court’s factual 
findings.   
The RNC petitioned for rehearing en banc.  We 
granted the petition for rehearing en banc the next day, 
Election Day, November 2, 2004.  This Court vacated the 
panel’s ruling and stayed the District Court’s Order.  Before 
the entire Court could hear the matter en banc, Malone cast 
her ballot without being challenged.  After Malone voted 
without challenge, Justice Souter, in his capacity as Circuit 
Justice for the Third Circuit, denied Malone’s application to 
the Supreme Court seeking reinstatement of the injunction.  
We dismissed the appeal as moot, without addressing the 
merits.   
E. 2008 Enforcement Action 
On November 3, 2008, the DNC alleged in a lawsuit 
that the RNC violated the Consent Decree by hiring private 
investigators to examine the backgrounds of some New 
Mexico voters in preparation for challenging those 
individuals’ voting eligibility.  The DNC requested a 
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preliminary injunction to prevent the RNC from using the 
information gathered by private investigators in any ballot 
security efforts.  The District Court denied the DNC’s Motion 
for a Preliminary Injunction, concluding that the RNC did not 
direct or participate in any ballot security measures, and held 
that the RNC had not violated the Consent Decree. 
F. Motion to Vacate or Modify the Consent Decree 
On November 3, 2008, shortly after the District Court 
denied the DNC’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, the 
RNC submitted the Motion to Vacate or Modify the Consent 
Decree that is currently at issue.  The RNC submitted several 
arguments in support of its motion: (1) since the 1987 
modification, the enactment of (a) the National Voter 
Registration Act of 1993 (the “NVRA” or “Motor Voter 
Law”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973gg et seq., (b) the Bipartisan 
Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (“BCRA”), 2 U.S.C. §§ 431 et 
seq., and (c) the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (“HAVA”), 
42 U.S.C. §§ 15301 et seq. increased the risk of voter fraud 
and decreased the risk of voter intimidation; (2) the Consent 
Decree extends to types of conduct that were not included in 
the initial 1981 Complaint; (3) the Decree was interpreted too 
broadly and inconsistently with the parties’ expectations at 
the time they entered the 1982 and 1987 settlements; and (4) 
the Decree violates the First Amendment by restricting 
communications between the RNC and state parties.   
The District Court held an evidentiary hearing on the 
motion during May 5 and 6, 2009 and also received post-
hearing submissions from the parties.  On December 1, 2009, 
the District Court issued an opinion, denying the motion to 
vacate the Decree.  First, the District Court rejected the 
RNC’s argument that the Consent Decree was void because it 
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“‘improperly extend[s] to ... private conduct’ and grants 
prospective relief beyond what the DNC could have achieved 
if the original 1981 action had been litigated.”  Democratic 
Nat’l Comm, 671 F. Supp 2d at 595.  The Court, instead, held 
the Decree was not void because parties can settle lawsuits by 
agreeing to broader relief than a court could have awarded 
otherwise.  Furthermore, the Court held that the RNC was 
barred from asserting this argument because the RNC 
willingly entered the Decree as a means of settling the initial 
1981 lawsuit and the RNC again consented to the Decree, as 
modified, in 1987.  The District Court also held that the 
Decree did not violate the First Amendment because, under 
the Decree, the RNC is free to communicate with state parties 
about subjects other than ballot security.  Additionally, the 
Court noted that the First Amendment applies only to state 
actions and does not prevent private parties from agreeing to 
refrain from certain types of speech.   
Next, the District Court considered the RNC’s 
arguments that the Decree should be vacated or modified due 
to changes in law, changes in fact, and the public interest in 
the RNC combating voter fraud.  The Court found that neither 
the purported changes nor the public interest justified 
vacating or modifying the Decree.  While the Court found 
that the Decree was not sufficiently unworkable to warrant 
vacating the Decree, the Court did find that four workability 
considerations justified modifying the Decree.  Those 
considerations are that: (1) the potential inequity of the RNC 
being subject to suits brought by entities who were not party 
to the Decree when, under the BCRA, the RNC has to defend 
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lawsuits using “hard money,”4 while the DNC would not have 
to spend any money on such suits because it would not be a 
party5
Thus, although the District Court denied the request to 
vacate the Decree, the Court granted the motion to modify the 
Decree.  The District Court’s modifications can be 
summarized as follows: 
; (2) the twenty-day notice requirement for preclearance 
prevents the RNC from combating mail-in voter registration 
fraud in a number of states with later mail-in voter 
registration deadlines; (3) the Decree lacked a clear definition 
of normal poll watching activities and the parties have not 
provided a definition, which has led the RNC to refrain from 
normal poll watching activities that the Decree was never 
intended to prohibit; and (4) the Decree lacked a termination 
date. 
                                                 
4 “‘[C]ontributions subject to [the Federal Election Campaign 
Act’s (FECA), 2 U.S.C. §§ 431–55] source, amount, and 
disclosure requirements’ came to be known as ‘hard 
money,’ while ‘[p]olitical donations made in such a way as to 
avoid federal regulations or limits’ came to be known as ‘soft 
money.’”  Shays v. FEC, 528 F.3d 914, 917 (D.C. Cir. 2008) 
(quoting Shays v. FEC, 414 F.3d 76, 80 (D.C. Cir. 2005) 
(“Shays II”); THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE 
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1652 (4th Ed. 2006)). 
5 The RNC would have to spend “hard money” on any 
lawsuits because the “BCRA made a number of dramatic 
changes to campaign finance law . . . , including barring 
national political parties from soliciting soft money.”  
Shays, 528 F.3d at 918 (citing 2 U.S.C. § 441i(a)). 
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1. Only parties to the Consent Decree, RNC and 
DNC, may bring an enforcement suit regarding 
a violation of the Decree. 
2. The preclearance period is shortened from 20 
days to 10 days. 
3. “Ballot security” is defined to include “any 
program aimed at combating voter fraud by 
preventing potential voters from registering to 
vote or casting a ballot.”  Democratic Nat’l 
Comm., 671 F. Supp. 2d at 622.  The 
modification also includes a non-exhaustive list 
of ballot security programs. 
4. “Normal poll-watch function” is defined as 
“stationing individuals at polling stations to 
observe the voting process and report 
irregularities unrelated to voter fraud to duly-
appointed state officials.”  Id.  The modification 
includes a non-exhaustive list of activities that 
do and do not fit into the Decree definition of 
normal poll-watch function.   
5. The Decree does not apply to any RNC program 
that does not have as at least one of its purposes 
the prevention of fraudulent voting or 
fraudulent voter registration. 
6. The Consent Decree expires on December 1, 
2017 (eight years after the date of the 
modification).  If, before that date, the DNC 
proves by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the RNC violated the Decree, the Decree will 
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extend for eight years from the date of the 
violation.   
The RNC filed a timely appeal.    
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction over 
the litigation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have 
jurisdiction over the appeal from the Consent Order, which 
contained an explicit reservation of appellate jurisdiction over 
the enforcement of the settlement terms, pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291.  See Keefe v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Co., 
203 F.3d 218, 223 (3d Cir. 2000); see also Halderman v. 
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 901 F.2d 311, 317 (3d Cir. 
1990) (holding that courts have jurisdiction to enforce 
settlement agreements incorporated into orders). 
We review the District Court’s decision modifying and 
refusing to vacate the Consent Order for abuse of discretion.  
Delaware Valley Citizens’ Counsel for Clean Air v. 
Pennsylvania, 755 F.2d 38, 41 (3d Cir. 1985).  To 
demonstrate that a district court abused its discretion, an 
appellant must show that the court’s decision was “arbitrary, 
fanciful or clearly unreasonable.”  Moyer v. United Dominion 
Indus., Inc., 473 F.3d 532, 542 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Stecyk 
v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 295 F.3d 408, 412 (3d Cir. 
2002). 
III.   ANALYSIS 
A. Legal Standard 
This Court has emphasized that, by signing a consent 
decree, signatories make a “free, calculated and deliberate 
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choice to submit to an agreed upon decree rather than seek a 
more favorable litigated judgment.”  United States Steel 
Corp. v. Fraternal Assoc. of Steel Haulers, 601 F.2d 1269, 
1274 (3d Cir. 1979).  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) 
provides that a court may relieve a party from an order when 
“the judgment is void,” “applying it prospectively is no 
longer equitable,” or for “any other reason that justifies 
relief.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b) (4), (5), (6).  Rule 60(b) does 
not provide, however, that an order may be rescinded or 
modified merely because it is no longer convenient for a party 
to comply with the consent order.  Rufo v. Inmates of the 
Suffolk County Jail, et al., 502 U.S. 367, 383 (1992); see 
Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council of Phila. & Vicinity, AFL-
CIO v. NLRB (“BCTC”), 64 F.3d 880, 887 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(holding that Rufo’s interpretation of Rule 60(b)(5) is a rule 
of general applicability and not limited to institutional reform 
litigation).   
The Supreme Court interpreted Rule 60(b)(5) in Rufo, 
clarifying that “a party seeking modification of a consent 
decree bears the burden of establishing that a significant 
change in circumstances warrants revision of the decree.”  
Rufo, 502 U.S. at 383.  Such a party must establish at least 
one of the following four factors by a preponderance of the 
evidence to obtain modification or vacatur: (1) a significant 
change in factual conditions; (2) a significant change in law; 
(3) that “a decree proves to be unworkable because of 
unforeseen obstacles”; or (4) that “enforcement of the decree 
without modification would be detrimental to the public 
interest.”  Id. at 384.   
The Court elaborated on the change in law factor, 
holding that a decree must be modified if “one or more of the 
obligations placed upon the parties has become 
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impermissible” and that a decree may be modified if “law has 
changed to make legal what the decree was designed to 
prevent.”  Id. at 388.  Typically, courts should not grant 
modification or vacatur “where a party relies upon events that 
actually were anticipated at the time it entered into a decree.”  
Id. at 385.  If a party agreed to the decree notwithstanding the 
anticipated change in conditions, “that party would have to 
satisfy a heavy burden to convince a court that it agreed to the 
decree in good faith, made a reasonable effort to comply with 
the decree, and should be relieved of the undertaking under 
Rule 60(b).”  Id. 
Although Rufo provides a general interpretation of 
Rule 60(b)(5), it does not provide a “universal formula” for 
deciding when applying a decree prospectively is no longer 
equitable.  BCTC, 64 F.3d at 888.  In addition to the Rufo 
standard, a court determining whether to vacate or modify a 
decree should respond to the specific set of circumstances 
before it by considering factors unique to the conditions of 
the case.  Id. (noting that “equity demands a flexible response 
to the unique conditions of each case”); The additional factors 
a court should typically consider before modifying or 
vacating a decree under Rule 60(b)(5) include:  
the circumstances leading to entry 
of the injunction and the nature of 
the conduct sought to be 
prevented; the length of time 
since entry of the injunction; 
whether the party subject to its 
terms has complied or attempted 
to comply in good faith with the 
injunction; and the likelihood that 
the conduct or conditions sought 
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to be prevented will recur absent 
the injunction. 
Id.   
In weighing these factors, “the court must balance the 
hardship to the party subject to the injunction against the 
benefits to be obtained from maintaining the injunction” and 
the court should also “determine whether the objective of the 
decree has been achieved.”  BCTC, 64 F.3d at 888.  While the 
decree and changed fact or law need not be completely 
inconsistent with each other, for such a change to justify 
vacatur, it must be significant, meaning that it renders the 
prospective application of the decree inequitable.  See BCTC, 
64 F.3d at 888. 
After a moving party has established a change warranting 
modification of a consent order, “the district court should 
determine whether the proposed modification is suitably 
tailored to the changed circumstance.”  Rufo, 502 U.S. at 391.  
The modification “must not create or perpetuate a 
constitutional violation”; it “should not strive to rewrite a 
consent order so that it conforms to the constitutional floor”; 
and a court should not try to modify a consent order except to 
make those revisions that equity requires, given the change in 
circumstances.  Id. 
B. Discussion 
The RNC asks that our Court vacate a decree that has 
as its central purpose preventing the intimidation and 
suppression of minority voters.  When, as here, a party 
voluntarily enters into a consent decree not once, but twice, 
and then waits over a quarter of a century before filing a 
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motion to vacate or modify6
At present, Appellant seeks review of the District 
Court's order denying vacatur because it prefers not to comply 
with the Consent Decree at a critical political juncture — the 
upcoming election cycle.  See Rufo, 502 U.S. at 383.  
However, we cannot disturb the District Court’s opinion 
unless it abused its discretion, meaning that its decision was 
“arbitrary, fanciful, or clearly unreasonable,” Moyer, 473 
F.3d at 542, when it found that the RNC failed to demonstrate 
that prospective application of the Decree, with the Court’s 
modifications, would not be equitable.   
 the decree, such action gives us 
pause.  Further, the RNC, with the advice of counsel, twice 
chose to limit indefinitely its ability to engage in certain 
activities enumerated in the Decree by entering into a decree 
with no expiration date.   
In reviewing the District Court’s opinion and its 
modifications to the Decree, we do not take lightly Judge 
Debevoise’s nearly three decades of experience presiding 
over all matters related to this Decree.  See Reconstruction 
Fin. Corp. v. Denver & R. G. W. R. Co., 328 U.S. 495, 533 
(1946) (according special weight to a district judge’s finding 
that a reorganization plan provided adequately for the 
equitable treatment of dissenters “[i]n view of the District 
Judge's familiarity with the reorganization”); Jenkins by 
Jenkins v. Missouri, 122 F.3d 588, 604 (8th Cir. 1997) 
(noting that a district judge had gained extensive knowledge 
                                                 
6 Although the RNC’s motion requested that the Court vacate 
or modify the Decree, the RNC has not referenced any 
modifications, short of vacatur, that would make applying the 
Decree equitable in the RNC’s view.   
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of the conditions relevant to a specific lawsuit because the 
judge had presided over the litigation for twenty years, from 
the time of its inception). 
We shall review whether the District Court abused its 
discretion by first holding that the Decree need not be vacated 
due to any First Amendment violation. 7
Next, we shall review whether the District Court 
abused its discretion regarding Rule 60(b)(5).  First, we shall 
analyze whether the District Court abused its discretion 
regarding the broad changed circumstances factors outlined in 
Rufo.  Second, we shall analyze whether the District Court 
abused its discretion regarding the BCTC factors specific to 
the parties and Consent Decree at issue.
    
8
                                                 
7 It is not clear from Appellant’s brief whether the RNC raises 
this First Amendment argument under Rule 60(b)(5) or Rule 
60(b)(6); however, we would reach the same conclusion 
under either rule because we do not find a First Amendment 
violation.  
  Third, we will 
inquire into whether the Court abused its discretion by 
We need not determine whether the District Court abused its 
discretion by holding that the Decree was not void due to its 
extension to private conduct and granting relief beyond that 
which the Court could order absent the Consent Decree 
because the RNC has not raised that issue on this appeal. 
8 Although the District Court opinion did not specifically 
reference any BCTC factors as such, the opinion did consider 
factors relevant to the specific circumstances of this Consent 
Decree, including the BCTC considerations that the parties 
raised. 
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holding that its prescribed modifications to the Decree were 
“suitably tailored to the changed circumstance[s].”9
The RNC has not demonstrated, by a preponderance of 
the evidence, the circumstances necessary for vacatur or for 
modifications, other than those ordered by the District Court.  
For the reasons set forth herein, we find that the District 
Court did not abuse its discretion in declining to vacate the 
Decree or in making the modifications to the Decree that it 
ordered. 
  Rufo, 
502 U.S. at 393. 
1. 
The RNC argues that the Consent Decree should be 
vacated because the Decree violates the First Amendment in 
two ways.  The RNC claims that the 2004 modifications to 
the Decree, which bar the RNC from engaging in ballot 
security activities absent District Court preclearance, serve as 
a prior restraint on the RNC’s right to engage in political 
speech.  Additionally, the RNC alleges that the District 
Court’s 1990 Order unconstitutionally forces speech by 
requiring the RNC to provide a copy of the Decree, or 
information regarding unlawful practices under the Decree, 
along with any ballot security instructional or informational 
materials that the RNC distributes to any state party.   
First Amendment 
                                                 
9 The District Court did not expressly state that the 
modifications it ordered were suitably tailored to the changes 
in circumstances, but the Court discussed in some detail how 
the modifications would address the specific workability 
concerns. 
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As the District Court correctly noted, in this context, 
the First Amendment applies only to state action.  Cent. 
Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539, 547 (1972).  Under 
Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), court enforcement of 
certain private agreements constitutes state action.  Id. at 19–
20 (holding that a state court injunction to enforce a racially 
restrictive covenant against parties who did not wish to 
discriminate is state action); Switlik v. Hardwicke Co., Inc., 
651 F.2d 852, 860 (3d Cir. 1981) (“the state court’s 
enforcement of an agreement between two private individuals 
can, in certain instances, constitute state action” (citing 
Shelley, 334 U.S. 1)).   
Although a court’s enforcement of a consent decree 
can constitute state action under Shelley, Shelley’s holding 
may not have sufficient reach to encompass the enforcement 
of this Decree.  The Supreme Court has declined to find state 
action where the court action in question is a far cry from the 
court enforcement in Shelley.  See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 
U.S. 991, 1004–05 (1982) (recognizing that state approval of 
or acquiescence to a private choice does not convert that 
choice into state action); Lavoie v. Bigwood, 457 F.2d 7, 
11 (1st Cir. 1972) (noting the theory that, under Shelley, court 
enforcement of a private agreement may only be state action 
if, “in resorting to a state sanction, a private party must 
necessarily make the state privy to his discriminatory 
purpose”).   
Even if court enforcement of this Consent Decree 
constitutes state action, “speech rights are not absolute.”  
Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n v. Brentwood 
Acad., 551 U.S. 291, 295 (2007).  “[C]onstitutional rights . . . 
may be contractually waived where the facts and 
circumstances surrounding the waiver make it clear that the 
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party foregoing its rights has done so of its own volition, with 
full understanding of the consequences of its waiver.”  Erie 
Telecomm., Inc. v. City of Erie, Pa., 853 F.2d 1084, 1096 (3d 
Cir. 1988).  Court enforcement of a private agreement to limit 
a party’s ability to speak or associate does not necessarily 
violate the First Amendment.  Ry. Emps. Dep’t. v. Hanson, 
351 U.S. 225 (1956) (holding that court enforcement of a 
union shop agreement, which would require all railroad 
employees to become union members does not violate the 
First Amendment right to association).10
The Supreme Court has long recognized that a party 
may waive constitutional rights if there is “clear” and 
“compelling” evidence of waiver and that waiver is voluntary, 
knowing, and intelligent.
     
11
                                                 
10 Furthermore, court orders can include limits on the ability 
of a party to speak, as occurs in confidentiality provisions 
regarding settlement agreements, and a party could bring an 
action for a court to enforce a private confidentiality 
agreement.  See Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 
772, 787-89 (3d Cir. 1994). 
  “Such volition and understanding 
11 See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482 (1981) (waiver 
of right to counsel must be voluntary, knowing, and 
intelligent); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 
(1975) (same); D.H. Overmyer Co. of Ohio  v. Frick Co.,405 
U.S. 174, 185–86, (1972) (waiver of due process rights must 
be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent); Curtis Publ’g Co. v. 
Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 145 (1967) (waiver of First Amendment 
rights must be shown by clear and compelling evidence); 
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (waiver requires 
“an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known 
right or privilege”). 
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are deemed to be, and indeed have been held to be, present, 
where the parties to the contract have bargaining equality and 
have negotiated the terms of the contract, and where the 
waiving party is advised by competent counsel and has 
engaged in other contract negotiations.”  Erie Telecomm., 853 
F.2d at 1096.   
“The question of waiver of a federally guaranteed 
constitutional right is, of course, a federal question controlled 
by federal law.”  Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4 (1966).  
The Supreme Court has held that courts must “‘indulge every 
reasonable presumption against waiver’ of fundamental 
constitutional rights.”  Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 
(1938) (quoting Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 
393 (1931)).  Determining whether waiver was voluntary, 
knowing, and intelligent in any particular case rests “upon the 
particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, 
including the background, experience and conduct” of the 
waiving party.  Id.   
Here, in 1982, the RNC, with the assistance of counsel, 
voluntarily entered into the Decree.  In consideration of the 
DNC and other plaintiffs amicably resolving all matters that 
were or could have been raised in the 1982 lawsuit, the RNC 
signed a settlement agreement in which they committed, 
among other provisions,  
to refrain from undertaking any 
ballot security activities in polling 
places or election districts where 
the racial or ethnic composition of 
such districts is a factor in the 
decision to conduct, or the actual 
conduct of, such activities there 
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and where a purpose or significant 
effect of such activities is to deter 
qualified voters from voting . . . 
(App. at 401–02.)  The RNC agreed that the terms of the 
Decree would bind the RNC, its agents, servants, and 
employees, “whether acting directly or indirectly through 
other party committees.”  (Id. at 402.) 
In 1987, the RNC once again entered into a settlement 
stipulation, with the assistance of counsel, agreeing to modify 
the 1982 Decree.  The Decree, as modified, clarified that 
“ballot security” efforts meant “ballot integrity, ballot 
security or other efforts to prevent or remedy voter fraud.”  
Democratic Nat’l Comm., 671 F. Supp. 2d at 581.  The 
modifications allow the RNC to engage in normal poll watch 
functions on Election Day so long as the people it deploys do 
not use or implement the results of any ballot security effort 
without a determination by the District Court that the ballot 
security effort complies with the provisions of the Decree and 
applicable law.  In order to secure such a determination, the 
RNC must submit a description of the program to the District 
Court following twenty days’ notice to the DNC.  Only with 
the District Court’s approval secured in this fashion can the 
RNC engage, assist, or participate in any ballot security 
program.  
A court can enforce an agreement preventing 
disclosure of specific information without violating the 
restricted party’s First Amendment rights if the party received 
consideration in exchange for the restriction.  See Alfred A. 
Knopf, Inc. v. Colby, 509 F.2d 1362, 1370 (4th Cir. 1975) 
(noting that executing a secrecy agreement can “effectively 
relinquish[] . . . First Amendment rights”).  
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That the Decree and its 1987 modification resolved all 
issues that could have been raised by the DNC and other 
plaintiffs in that litigation was sufficient consideration to 
evidence a waiver.  See D.H. Overmyer Co. of Ohio v. Frick 
Co., 405 U.S. 174, 186-87 (1971) (holding that the presence 
of consideration constitutes some evidence of a waiver).     
The Supreme Court has held that there is a valid 
waiver of constitutional rights where the party that waived 
“was a corporation with widespread activities and a 
complicated corporate structure; [the parties] had equal 
bargaining power; and [where the waiving party] did not 
contend that it or its counsel was unaware of the significance 
of the [instrument in which it waived notice].”  Erie 
Telecomm., 853 F.2d at 1095 (citing D.H. Overmyer, 405 
U.S. at 186).   Here, the RNC has widespread activities, had 
equal bargaining power with the plaintiffs, and has not 
contended that it was unaware of the significance of the 
Decree, which it was free to decide not to enter into.  The 
RNC also received consideration— the plaintiffs in the 1982 
and 1987 lawsuits relinquished all claims that could have 
arisen from those actions.  The RNC “may not now seek to 
withdraw from performing its obligations and from 
discharging its burdens, while it still continues to retain all of 
the benefits it received . . . as a result of the agreement[].”  
Erie Telecomm., 853 F.2d at 1097.  The 1982 and 1987 
settlement agreements, signed by counsel for the RNC, are 
clear and compelling evidence that the RNC voluntarily, 
knowingly, and intelligently waived certain First Amendment 
rights.   
  The RNC alleges that the District Court Orders from 
1990 and 2004 violate its First Amendment rights.  However, 
neither order imposes limitations on the RNC’s First 
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Amendment rights beyond those that the RNC voluntarily 
waived in 1982 and 1987.  In 1990, the Court held that the 
RNC must provide a copy of the Consent Decree, or 
information regarding unlawful practices under the Consent 
Decree, along with any ballot security materials that the RNC 
distributes to any state party.  Despite the RNC’s arguments 
before our Court, any restrictions on the RNC’s ability to 
communicate and associate with state and local parties are 
self-imposed and waived by the RNC entering into the Decree 
in 1982 and 1987.   
In 2004, the District Court issued an Order barring the 
RNC from using a voter challenge list targeting precincts with 
large African-American populations that the RNC had 
compiled in coordination with the Ohio Republican Party.  
The District Court found that the RNC had violated the 
Decree both procedurally and substantively by participating 
with the Ohio Republican Party in devising and implementing 
the ballot security program and failing to obtain preclearance 
for the program.  The 2004 Order does not impose any 
additional limitation on the speech rights of the RNC beyond 
those present in the 1982 and 1987 Decree and modifications, 
in which the RNC consented and agreed to certain restrictions 
of its rights.  Hence, neither the 1990 nor 2004 Orders present 
a basis for a First Amendment challenge.  
In 1982 and 1987, the RNC voluntarily agreed to 
create and abide by the very provisions that it now challenges 
as unconstitutional.  The District Court’s enforcement of the 
Decree against the RNC does not result in a First Amendment 
violation.  The District Court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying the request to vacate the Decree on this basis. 
2. Rufo Factors 
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We now address the three Rufo factors in turn. 
a. Changed Factual Circumstances 
The Decree and its 1987 modification aim primarily to 
prevent the RNC from “using, [or] appearing to use, racial or 
ethnic criteria in connection with ballot integrity, ballot 
security or other efforts to prevent or remedy suspected vote 
fraud” and to neither “hinder[] [nor] discourag[e] qualified 
voters from exercising the right to vote.”  (App. at 404–05.)  
Given these purposes of the Decree, only a change that 
decreases minority voter intimidation and vote suppression ex 
ante can be a “significant change [that] warrants revision of 
the decree.”  Rufo, 502 U.S. at 383.   
The RNC argues that the following factual changes 
warranted vacatur or modification of the Decree: first, the 
President and Attorney General of the United States and the 
President of the RNC (former) are African American; 12
                                                 
12 The only witness called by the RNC at the evidentiary 
hearing before the District Court  was Thomas Josefiak, an 
election law expert who was appointed by President Ronald 
Reagan to serve as the Commissioner of the Federal Election 
Commission from 1985 until 1992.  Josefiak testified that, 
since 1982, there has been a 41.6 percent increase in the 
number of registered voters classified as black and a 201 
percent increase in the number of registered voters classified 
as Hispanic.  The District Court discounted this increase 
based on the concomitant increase in the overall population of 
blacks and Hispanics.  Democratic Nat’l Comm., 671 F.Supp. 
2d at 598-99. 
 
second, that minority voter registration and turnout have 
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increased; and third, that increased availability of alternative 
voting mechanisms such as early voting or permanent 
absentee voting are more widely available.  The RNC also 
presented testimony at the evidentiary hearing before the 
District Court that the appointment of African-Americans as 
the RNC Chairman and Chief Administrative Officer 
decreased the likelihood that the RNC would engage in ballot 
security programs resulting in minority vote suppression.  
Testimony presented by the RNC further claimed that “with 
an African–American President, and an African–American 
Attorney General, [] the laws that are already on the books 
regarding voter fraud, voter intimidation, and voter 
suppression are going to be actively pursued by this Justice 
Department.”  (Hr’g Tr. 65:22–66:2.)   
The RNC argues that increases in minority voter 
registration and voter turnout are changes in factual 
circumstances rendering the Decree unnecessary because this 
data “demonstrat[es] that minority voters are not being 
suppressed.”  (Appellant’s Br. 33.)  Furthermore, the RNC 
asserts that the availability of alternative voting methods, 
such as early voting or permanent absentee voting, allows 
voters who are worried about intimidation at precincts on 
Election Day to avoid such intimidation by voting from home 
or voting early.  It contends that records of voters using these 
alternative voting mechanisms undermine allegations of 
disenfranchisement and that “the availability of provisional 
ballots squelches any effort to disenfranchise a voter who 
appears at the polls.”  (Id. at 38.) 
The RNC’s argument that the fact that President 
Obama, Attorney General Eric Holder, RNC Chairman 
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Michael Steele,13
Even assuming that VRA violations will be more 
vigorously litigated by the current administration, that 
litigation would likely be brought after the VRA has been 
violated, so it will not prevent minority voter intimidation or 
vote suppression ex ante.  Similarly, a handful of minorities 
temporarily
 and another RNC leader are minorities 
justifies vacatur or modification of the Decree hardly requires 
a serious response.  The RNC posits that a minority President 
and Attorney General of the United States increase the 
likelihood of prosecution for violations of the Voting Rights 
Act (“VRA”), such as intimidation of minority voters.  Are 
we to conclude that all issues that affect African-Americans 
will now get greater funding, greater attention, and more 
focus because of President Obama?  Our jurisprudence cannot 
depend on such assumptions. 
14
Contrary to the RNC’s assertions, the increase in 
minority voter registration and voter turnout since 1982 does 
not demonstrate that “minority voters are not being 
suppressed.”  (Appellant’s Br. 33.)  The RNC has submitted 
no evidence to support its supposition.  Voter registration and 
turnout data is not statistically relevant regarding the 
 occupying leadership positions in the RNC does 
not mean that minority voter intimidation or suppression will 
decrease.   
                                                 
13 Michael Steele served as the first African-American 
chairman of the RNC from January 2009 until January 2011.   
14 Even if the racial background of the nation’s or RNC’s 
leaders makes voter intimidation and suppression less likely, 
it is illogical to vacate the Decree due to the racial makeup of 
the administration of the United States or the RNC.   
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argument that revision of the Decree is warranted.  Moreover, 
the increase in minority voter registration and voter turnout 
could be evidence that the Decree is necessary and effective.  
The RNC’s data on minority voter registration and turnout 
demonstrates that, since the RNC consented to the Decree in 
1982, minority voter registration and turnout have increased 
significantly.  The Decree’s purpose is to help ensure that 
potential minority voters are not dissuaded from going to the 
polling station to vote, as they might be if the RNC were 
unfettered by the Decree.      
Despite the RNC’s bald assertion to the contrary, the 
availability of alternative voting mechanisms is not a factual 
change that prevents polling place voter suppression and 
intimidation.  The RNC has presented no evidence 
demonstrating how alternative voting mechanisms, such as 
allowing voters to vote prior to Election Day or to mail in 
their votes, would prevent the RNC from “using, [or] 
appearing to use, racial or ethnic criteria in connection with 
ballot integrity, ballot security or other efforts to prevent or 
remedy suspected vote fraud” at polling stations.  (App. at 
404–05.)  Furthermore, as the District Court notes, voters 
should not have to avoid voting at polling stations on Election 
Day in order to avoid voter intimidation.     
 None of these alleged factual changes renders the 
continuation of the Decree inequitable.  The District Court 
did not abuse its discretion by declining to vacate or modify 
the Decree based on the RNC’s asserted factual changes. 
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b. Changes in Law15
The RNC’s arguments regarding changes in law 
brought about by the enactments of the Motor Voter Law or 
NVRA, BCRA,
 
16
                                                 
15 We need not determine whether the alleged changes in First 
Amendment law raised by the RNC render prospective 
application of the Decree inequitable because we find that the 
RNC waived any relevant First Amendment rights by 
consenting to the 1982 and 1987 Decrees. 
 and HAVA are only relevant to our review 
if they render prospective application of the Decree 
inequitable.  To do that, they must have some bearing on the 
purpose of the Decree — decreasing the RNC’s engagement 
in minority voter intimidation and suppression.  The RNC 
asserts that the Motor Voter Law, BCRA, and HAVA 
increase the risk of voter fraud and increase the ease with 
which eligible voters can register to vote, vote, and file a 
provisional ballot if they are challenged at polling stations.  
Even if the RNC’s assertions are true, which has not been 
established, the RNC has failed to carry its burden of 
establishing that a significant change in circumstances 
warrants revision of the Decree.  Additionally, none of the 
changes in law that the RNC puts forth make “one or more of 
the obligations placed upon the parties [] impermissible under 
federal law” or “make legal what the decree was designed to 
prevent.”  Rufo, 502 U.S. at 388.      
16 Because the RNC’s arguments regarding the BCRA center 
on the Decree’s workability, the majority of our review of the 
District Court’s opinion regarding the BCRA is included in 
the workability discussion infra. 
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“One of the NVRA’s central purposes was to 
dramatically expand opportunities for voter registration and to 
ensure that, once registered, voters could not be removed 
from the registration rolls by a failure to vote or because they 
had changed addresses.”  Welker v. Clarke, 239 F.3d 596, 
598–99 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg(b)).17
                                                 
17 In Welker v. Clarke, 239 F.3d 596 (3d Cir. 2001), we noted 
that 
  The 
NVRA authorizes election officials to use mailings to update 
voter registration rolls.  Additionally, the NVRA imposes 
criminal penalties on individuals who submit false voter 
registration forms, knowingly cast a forged ballot, or 
To achieve this purpose, 
the NVRA strictly limited 
removal of voters based on 
change of address and instead 
required that, for federal elections, 
states maintain accurate 
registration rolls by using reliable 
information from government 
agencies such as the Postal 
Service's change of address 
records.  The NVRA went even 
further by also requiring the 
implementation of “fail-safe” 
voting procedures to ensure voters 
would not be removed from 
registration rolls due to clerical 
errors or the voter's own failure to 
re-register at a new address.  
Id. at 599 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(b)(1)). 
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manipulate the tabulation of votes, and it specifies criminal 
penalties for intimidating, threatening, or coercing any person 
who is registering to vote or voting.  42 U.S.C. §1973gg-
10(1)(A), 10(2).  
The RNC argues that the NVRA renders the Decree 
antiquated because it has led to significant increases in 
minority voter registration and turnout.  The RNC also asserts 
that the NVRA creates an increased risk of voter fraud.  This 
argument, that the enactment of a law that expands voter 
registration opportunities renders inequitable a Decree that 
aims to prevent voter intimidation and suppression, is 
unpersuasive.  The District Court correctly notes that any 
increase in minority voter registration or voter turnout caused 
by the Motor Voter Law is irrelevant to the Decree because 
“the Consent Decree was not designed to encourage minority 
voter registration, but rather to prevent voter suppression.”  
Democratic Nat’l Comm., 671 F. Supp. 2d at 614.  
Additionally, the District Court cites evidence that the Motor 
Voter Law reduces the threat of voter registration fraud, but 
does not attempt to prevent voter suppression.  Id. 
Nor does the NVRA “make legal what the decree was 
designed to prevent.”  Rufo, 502 U.S. at 388.  The NVRA 
authorizes election officials, not the RNC, to use mailings to 
update voter registration lists.  42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(c)-(d).  
The NVRA does not authorize targeting such mailings at 
predominantly minority precincts nor does the NVRA 
authorize the presence of voter fraud security teams targeted 
at predominantly minority precincts on Election Day, both 
actions that the Decree is designed to prevent.   
The NVRA provision that makes voter intimidation 
subject to a criminal penalty is not relevant to the purpose of 
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the Decree because it would not prevent minority voter 
intimidation or suppression.  The provision allows for 
criminal penalties to be imposed ex post, only after voters had 
been intimidated and had lost their opportunity to cast their 
ballots.  This provision does not render inequitable the 
application of the Decree, in which the RNC agreed not to 
“us[e], [or] appear[] to use, racial or ethnic criteria in 
connection with ballot integrity, ballot security or other 
efforts to prevent or remedy suspected vote fraud.”  (App. at 
404–05.)   
The “central provisions” of the BCRA were “designed 
to address Congress’ concerns about the increasing use of soft 
money and issue advertising to influence federal elections.”  
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 132 (2003).  The 
“BCRA made a number of dramatic changes to campaign 
finance law to achieve these goals, including barring national 
political parties from soliciting soft money.”  Shays v. Federal 
Election Comm'n, 528 F.3d 914, 918 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (citing 
2 U.S.C. § 441i(a)).  The BCRA also “barred state parties 
from spending soft money on ‘federal election activity,’ 
including ‘get-out-the-vote activity’ and ‘voter registration 
activity.’”  Id. (quoting 2 U.S.C. § 441i(b)(1)).   
The RNC argues that the BCRA’s prohibition on the 
spending of soft money by state parties for voter registration 
and get-out-the-vote activity has heightened the risk of voter 
fraud because it is difficult to track the voter registration 
efforts of the increased number of groups registering voters.  
As the District Court mentions, the Decree does not prevent 
the RNC from collaborating with non-party organizations to 
register voters and the RNC has not demonstrated that any 
ineligible voter registered by a non-party organization has 
ever actually cast a vote.  The RNC has not demonstrated that 
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this provision of the BCRA is a significant change in the law 
that warrants revision of the Decree.   
“HAVA is concerned with updating election 
technologies and other election-day issues at polling places.”  
Gonzalez v. Arizona, 624 F.3d 1162, 1184 (9th Cir. 2010).  
One purpose of HAVA was “to prevent on-the-spot denials of 
provisional ballots to voters deemed ineligible to vote by poll 
workers.”  Sandusky County Democratic Party v. Blackwell, 
387 F.3d 565, 574 (6th Cir. 2004).18
The provisional ballot portion of HAVA is not aimed 
at preventing voter suppression or intimidation and does not 
render the prospective application of the Decree inequitable.  
Despite the RNC’s assertions, the fact that HAVA affords 
every voter the opportunity to cast a provisional ballot is only 
effective if those voters are not intimidated by voter fraud 
efforts, such as those targeted by the Decree.  As the District 
Court notes, voter intimidation could prevent voters from 
entering the polls to obtain a provisional ballot.  Democratic 
Nat’l Comm., 671 F. Supp. 2d at 612–13, 616 (“Some voters . 
  HAVA also established 
complaint procedures to challenge alleged voting violations.  
42 U.S.C. § 15512.  The RNC argues that HAVA increases 
the risk of voter fraud and reduces the risk of vote 
suppression by allowing voters to cast provisional ballots.  
                                                 
18 “HAVA requires that any individual affirming that he or 
she ‘is a registered voter in the jurisdiction in which the 
individual desires to vote and that the individual is eligible to 
vote in an election for Federal office . . . shall be permitted to 
cast a provisional ballot.””  Sandusky County Democratic 
Party v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 565, 574 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing 
42 U.S.C. § 15482(a)). 
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. . may choose to refrain from voting rather than wait for the 
qualifications of those ahead of them to be verified . . . Others 
may be prevented from waiting by responsibilities . . .” (citing 
DNC Hr’g Ex. 18 at 6; RNC Hr’g Ex. 26 at 56; League of 
Women Voters of Ohio v. Brunner, 548 F.3d 463, 478 (6th 
Cir. 2008)).  The opportunity to cast a provisional ballot is not 
relevant to the purpose of the Decree because it does not 
decrease minority voter intimidation or suppression.    
The availability of complaint procedures for alleged 
voting violations under HAVA does not “make legal what the 
decree was designed to prevent.”  Rufo, 502 U.S. at 388.  
Moreover, the HAVA complaint procedures, unlike the 
Decree, do not aim to prevent the RNC from targeting its 
voter fraud efforts at precincts with higher populations of 
minorities. 
The District Court did not abuse its discretion when it 
found that the Motor Voter Law, BCRA, and HAVA have 
“not altered [the] calculus” of in-person voter fraud or voter 
intimidation to an extent that justifies vacating or modifying 
the Decree due to a change in law.  Democratic Nat’l Comm., 
671 F. Supp. 2d at 613.   
c. Public Interest 
The RNC argues that vacating the Decree would 
benefit the public interest by allowing the RNC to engage in 
programs attempting to prevent voter fraud, which the RNC 
alleges are hampered by the Decree.  Additionally, the RNC 
contends that there is little need to prevent the intimidation 
and suppression of minority voters.  Specifically, the RNC 
asserts that voter fraud is a danger and that “political parties, 
candidates, the Government, and the public all have an 
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undisputed interest in protecting the integrity of the election 
process.”  (Appellant’s Br. at 50.)  Thus, the RNC argues that 
it should be permitted to address voter fraud free from the 
constraints of the Decree.   
If the RNC establishes that “a durable remedy has been 
implemented, continued enforcement of the order is not only 
unnecessary, but improper.”  Horne v. Flores,  --- U.S. ----, ---
-, 129 S. Ct. 2579, 2595 (2009) (holding that the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit employed a 
heightened standard for its Rule 60(b)(5) inquiry instead of 
the required flexible approach).  However, the RNC has 
pointed to no remedy other than the Decree that prevents the 
RNC from “using, [or] appearing to use, racial or ethnic 
criteria in connection with ballot integrity, ballot security or 
other efforts to prevent or remedy suspected vote fraud.”  
(App. at 404–05.) 
The District Court declined to determine whether laws 
passed by Congress sufficiently address the dangers of voter 
fraud, recognizing that such is not the task of the federal 
court.  Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, ----, 129 S. Ct. 1231, 
1245 (2009) (“Though courts are capable of making refined 
and exacting factual inquiries, they ‘are inherently ill-
equipped’ to ‘make decisions based on highly political 
judgments’ . . .”) (quoting Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 894 
(1994) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment)).  Instead, the 
Court noted that Congress is better equipped to make this 
determination by weighing the dangers of voter fraud against 
the dangers of voter intimidation. 
The District Court rejected the RNC’s argument that 
the Decree must be vacated or modified because the risk of 
voter fraud outweighs the risk of voter suppression and 
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intimidation.  As the District Court correctly points out, the 
Decree only requires preclearance for programs involving the 
prevention of in-person voter fraud.  Furthermore, the District 
Court has never prevented the RNC from implementing a 
voter fraud prevention program that the RNC has submitted 
for preclearance, at least in part, because the RNC has never 
submitted any voter fraud prevention program for 
preclearance.   
Although the RNC pointed to charges that were noted 
in the Carter-Baker Commission Report against eighty-nine 
individuals and fifty-two convicted individuals to 
demonstrate the pervasiveness of voter fraud, those purported 
instances of voter fraud ranged “from vote-buying to 
submitting false voter registration information and voting-
related offenses by non-citizens.”  (RNC Hr’g Ex. 26 at 45.)  
Thus, only a fraction of that alleged fraudulent activity was 
related to in-person voter fraud, which is the type of fraud 
addressed in the Decree.   
The FBI report that the RNC submitted regarding 
irregularities in Wisconsin during the 2004 election did not 
specify whether the voting irregularities under investigation 
involved votes cast in person or votes cast through absentee 
voting or some other alternative process.  In support of the 
notion that most alleged incidents of voter fraud are not 
related to in-person voting and are, thus, irrelevant to the 
Decree, the DNC submitted evidence of voting irregularities 
in Florida during the 2004 election, which was also cited by 
the RNC, that showed that “the majority of those accused of 
wrongdoing were elected officials and political operatives.”  
Democratic Nat’l Comm., 671 F. Supp. 2d at 607.   
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The Supreme Court has also noted the rarity of in-
person voter fraud.  Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 
553 U.S. 181, 194 (2008) (noting that there was “no evidence 
of any [in-person voter] fraud actually occurring in Indiana at 
any time in its history); see also id. at 226 (Souter, J., 
dissenting) (“[T]he State has not come across a single 
instance of in-person voter impersonation fraud in all of 
Indiana’s history.”); Democratic Nat’l Comm., 671 F. Supp. 
2d at 609 (“Justice Stevens acknowledged that, of the 
‘occasional examples’ of in-person fraud on which his ruling 
was based, all but one had been shown to have been 
‘overstated because much of the fraud was actually absentee 
ballot fraud or voter registration fraud.’” (quoting Crawford, 
553 U.S. at 196 n.12)).  Thus, the RNC has not established 
that in-person voter fraud is sufficiently prevalent such that 
applying the Decree prospectively is no longer equitable.  
Even if the public has an unmet need for the prevention of in-
person fraud, the Decree does not prevent the RNC from 
combating in-person voter fraud if it obtains preclearance.  If 
the risk of voter fraud is as great and consequential as the 
RNC alleges and an RNC voter security program is a 
significant part of efforts needed to prevent that voter fraud, it 
would seem that the RNC would have attempted to obtain 
preclearance for a voter security program at least once since 
1987.  
The RNC argues that “minority voters are not being 
suppressed,” and, thus, the Decree does not serve public 
interest.  (Appellant’s Br. 33.)  The District Court noted as an 
example, however, that the voter-challenge list in Malone 
included 35,000 registered voters who were predominantly 
minorities.  Without the enforcement of the Decree 
provisions, these voter-challenge lists that are racially-
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targeted, in intent or in effect, could result in the intimidation 
and deterrence of a number of voters.   
When confronted with such targeted voter-challenge 
lists, some eligible voters may choose to refrain from voting 
instead of waiting for the verification of their own eligibility 
or that of others ahead of them in line.  (See, e.g., DNC Hr’g 
Ex. 18 at 6 (quoting a former Political Director of the 
Republican Party of Texas, who stated that photo 
identification requirements “could cause enough of a dropoff 
in legitimate Democratic voting to add three percent to the 
Republican vote.”); RNC Hr’g Ex. 26 at 56 (portion of the 
Carter-Baker Commission Report on “Polling Station 
Operations,” in which  the Report noted voter fraud security 
in some minority communities may be “intimidating” and 
that, during the 2004 election, “[p]roblems with polling 
station operations, such as long lines, were more pronounced 
in some places than others.  This gave rise to suspicions that 
the problems were due to discrimination . . .”).)  
The District Court did not abuse its discretion by 
finding that public interest concerns, including the prevention 
of voter fraud and the prevention of voter suppression and 
intimidation, do not justify vacatur or modification of the 
Decree. 
d. Workability 
The RNC argued before the District Court that there 
were workability issues that required modification of the 
Decree, as a practical matter.  The District Court held that 
there were four workability issues that weighed in favor of 
modification: (1) the potential inequity of the RNC being 
subject to suits brought by entities who were not party to the 
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Decree when,  under the BCRA, the RNC has to defend 
lawsuits using “hard money,” while the DNC does not have to 
spend any money on such suits because it would not be  party 
to them19
The District Court, accordingly, modified the Decree 
in the following ways: (1) allowed only parties to the Decree, 
the DNC and NJDSC, to bring an enforcement action under 
the Decree; (2) decreased the preclearance notice requirement 
from twenty days to ten days; (3) provided clearer definitions 
and examples of “ballot security”
; (2) the twenty-day notice requirement for 
preclearance prevents the RNC from combating mail-in voter 
registration fraud in a number of states with later mail-in 
voter registration deadlines; (3) the Decree lacks a clear 
definition of normal poll watching activities and the parties 
have not provided a definition, leading the RNC to refrain 
from normal poll watching activities, which the Decree was 
never intended to prohibit; and (4) the Decree lacked a 
termination date.   
20 and “normal poll 
watching”21
                                                 
19 The RNC would have to spend “hard money” on any 
lawsuits because the “BCRA made a number of dramatic 
changes to campaign finance law . . . , including barring 
national political parties from soliciting soft money.”  
Shays, 528 F.3d at 918 (citing 2 U.S.C. § 441i(a)). 
 activities; and (4) added an eight-year expiration 
20 “Ballot security” is defined to include “any program aimed 
at combating voter fraud by preventing potential voters from 
registering to vote or casting a ballot.”  Democratic Nat’l 
Comm., 671 F. Supp. 2d at 622.  The modification also 
includes a non-exhaustive list of ballot security programs. 
21 “Normal poll-watch function” is defined as “stationing 
individuals at polling stations to observe the voting process 
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date, December 1, 2017, to the Decree, allowing for an 
extension of the Decree for another eight years if the DNC 
proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the RNC has 
violated the Decree.  
In addition to determining whether the District Court 
abused its discretion by declining to make more extensive 
modifications to the Decree than it did based on workability 
concerns, we analyze, also under the abuse of discretion 
standard, whether the District Court’s “proposed modification 
is suitably tailored to the changed circumstance.”  Rufo, 502 
U.S. at 391.  As noted above, the modification “must not 
create or perpetuate a constitutional violation”; it “should not 
strive to rewrite a consent order so that it conforms to the 
constitutional floor”; and a court should not try to modify a 
consent order other than making those revisions that equity 
requires because of the change in circumstances.  Id. 
The District Court held that the Decree should be 
modified because the BCRA creates a potential inequity 
between the RNC and the DNC if third parties are allowed to 
bring suits to enforce the Decree against the RNC.  Without 
modification, the RNC would have to defend such third-party 
suits with limited “hard money” because it cannot solicit “soft 
money” under the BCRA while the DNC, not a party to such 
suits, would not have to expend resources on these third-party 
suits.  Accordingly, the District Court modified the Decree so 
                                                                                                             
and report irregularities unrelated to voter fraud to duly-
appointed state officials.”  Democratic Nat’l Comm., 671 F. 
Supp. 2d at 622.  The modification includes a non-exhaustive 
list of activities that do and do not fit into the Decree 
definition of normal poll-watch function. 
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that only the DNC and NJDSC can bring an enforcement 
action under the Decree so that both parties would have to 
spend “hard money” on the enforcement action.  This 
modification eliminates any potential BCRA-caused inequity 
in the prospective application of the Decree.          
In this respect, the Court revised the Decree only to the 
extent required because of the change in circumstances 
brought about by the BCRA.  Limiting the ability to bring 
Decree enforcement actions to parties to the Decree is a 
modification suitably tailored to the equitable concerns 
brought about by the “hard money” restrictions in the BCRA.    
The RNC argues that this modification does not 
address the workability issues caused by the costly and 
distracting enforcement actions filed shortly before Election 
Days because the money the RNC would have to spend 
defending those suits takes money away from the RNC’s 
political efforts, regardless of whether the DNC also has to 
spend money to bring those suits.  The nature and timing of 
election cycles may cause the need to defend against Decree 
enforcement suits to arise at inconvenient times, but resolving 
those issues before Election Day is crucial to enforcing the 
Decree by ensuring access to the polls and preventing 
suppression of minority votes.   
In effect, the RNC contends that the Decree should be 
vacated because it is unworkable for the RNC to spend any 
money defending itself in enforcement actions.  This 
argument is not persuasive.  When the RNC twice consented 
to the Decree and gained its benefits, it should have 
anticipated that it would likely need to spend money 
defending itself in future enforcement actions.  Neither 
modification nor vacatur are justified “where a party relies 
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upon events that actually were anticipated at the time it 
entered into a decree.”  Rufo, 502 U.S. at 385.   
The District Court noted that a number of states now 
have voter registration deadlines less than twenty days before 
the election and that the RNC has a valid interest in 
preventing fraudulent voter registration.  The District Court 
modified the Decree by decreasing the notice requirement for 
preclearance from twenty days to ten days.     
The RNC argues that the ten-day preclearance period 
should be eliminated because it forces the party to reveal its 
Election Day strategy to the DNC in order to combat voter 
fraud and is, therefore, unworkable.  The RNC has requested 
zero days for preclearance or, at least, some decrease in the 
time period for the preclearance notice requirement.22
The RNC’s argument is wholly speculative.  The 
RNC’s supposed knowledge and experience of unworkability 
is mere conjecture because, since the preclearance provision 
  The 
RNC asserts that “any preclearance requirement is tantamount 
to a prohibition on Election Day activities by the RNC” 
because it means that the RNC must foresee Election Day 
issues twenty to thirty-five days in advance of an election; 
“forc[es] the RNC to disclose its tactical thinking and 
Election Day strategy far enough in advance for the DNC and 
others to craft counter-strategies”; and it “requires the RNC to 
place equivalent numbers of poll watchers in all precincts, 
regardless of political or practical considerations.”  
(Appellant’s Br. at 52–54.)  
                                                 
22 The RNC suggested two to three days for preclearance at 
oral argument, but could not articulate a basis for such a 
modification other than it would be better than ten days. 
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was added to the Decree in 1987, the RNC has never 
attempted to obtain preclearance.  Contrary to the RNC’s 
argument, the preclearance provision does not require the 
RNC to disclose its tactical thinking and Election Day 
strategy except with regard to ballot security activities.  The 
RNC points to no statement of the District Court and no 
provision of the Decree that requires the RNC “to place 
equivalent numbers of poll watchers in all precincts.”  
(Appellant’s Br. at 52–54.)   
On the contrary, the Decree does not require any 
preclearance for normal poll watching functions, so the 
Decree would in no way prohibit the RNC from placing 
different numbers of poll watchers in precincts.  Further, there 
is no basis for any RNC argument that the preclearance 
provision requires the RNC to place the same number of voter 
fraud security team members at each precinct.  The RNC does 
not know what level of program detail the District Court 
would require before granting preclearance.23
                                                 
23 For example, perhaps the RNC could obtain preclearance 
for a voter fraud security program that instructs its normal 
poll watchers that, if they see a person who they believe is 
voting more than once, they can report that potential fraud to 
poll workers. 
  The 
preclearance provision does not prevent the RNC from 
achieving its objective of normal poll-watching, carrying out 
approved ballot security programs, or implementing any other 
Election Day strategies that do not “us[e], [or] appear[] to 
use, racial or ethnic criteria in connection with ballot 
integrity, ballot security or other efforts to prevent or remedy 
suspected vote fraud.”  (App. at 404–05.)   
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With no preclearance provision, the RNC could 
implement any ballot security program and would only be 
subject to enforcement of the Decree after potential minority 
voter intimidation and suppression had already occurred.  
Thus, the elimination of the provision would thwart the 
Decree’s purpose of preventing minority voter intimidation 
and suppression ex ante.  The District Court shortened the 
preclearance time to allow the RNC to combat more of the 
potential voter registration fraud that might occur closer to 
Election Day, a modification suitably tailored to address the 
inequity the District Court identified. 
Although the Decree was never intended to prohibit 
normal poll watching activities, the RNC claims that is has 
refrained from engaging in normal poll watching activities 
because the Decree’s definitions of such activities are unclear 
and it fears it would unintentionally violate the Decree.  To 
address this workability concern, the District Court modified 
the Decree to provide clearer definitions and examples of 
“ballot security” and “normal poll watching” activities.  With 
the District Court’s modifications, “[b]allot security” is 
defined to include “any program aimed at combating voter 
fraud by preventing potential voters from registering to vote 
or casting a ballot,”24
                                                 
24 The modification includes a non-exhaustive list of ballot 
security programs: 
 and “[n]ormal poll-watch function” is 
the compilation of voter challenge 
lists by use of mailings or 
reviewing databases maintained 
by state agencies such as motor 
vehicle records, social security 
records, change of address forms, 
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defined as “stationing individuals at polling stations to 
observe the voting process and report irregularities unrelated 
to voter fraud to duly-appointed state officials.”  Democratic 
Nat’l Comm., 671 F. Supp. 2d at 622.   
The District Court’s modifications more clearly define 
ballot security and normal poll-watch function under the 
Decree and provide lists of examples of both. 25
                                                                                                             
and voter lists assembled pursuant 
to the HAVA; the use of 
challengers to confront potential 
voters and verify their eligibility 
at the polls on either Election Day 
or a day on which they may take 
advantage of state early voting 
procedures; the recording by 
photographic or other means of 
voter likenesses or vehicles at any 
poling place; and the distribution 
of literature informing individuals 
at or near a polling place that 
voter fraud is a crime or detailing 
the penalties under any state or 
federal statute for impermissibly 
casting a ballot.   
  The RNC 
Democratic Nat’l Comm., 671 F. Supp. 2d at 622. 
25 The modification also includes a non-exhaustive list of 
activities that do and do not fit into the Decree definition of 
normal poll-watch function: 
[O]bservers may report any 
disturbance that they reasonably 
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contends that it cannot engage in normal poll-watch functions 
because the definitions of the terms remain unclear.  Contrary 
to the RNC’s argument that the District Court’s definitions 
and non-exhaustive lists of examples “worsen the problem,” 
(Appellant’s Br. at 55), the modifications of adding specific 
definitions and examples of ballot security and normal poll-
watch functions give both the RNC and the DNC more clarity 
regarding what types of activities require preclearance, which 
do not require preclearance, and which are prohibited by the 
Decree.   
Given these modifications, any hardship to the RNC is 
not a product of the terms of the Decree.  Clarity allows the 
RNC to engage in normal poll watching activities while still 
                                                                                                             
believe might deter eligible voters 
from casting their ballots, 
including malfunctioning voting 
machines, long lines, or 
understaffing at polling places.  
Such observers may not question 
voters about their credentials; 
impede or delay voters by asking 
for identification, videotape, 
photograph, or otherwise make 
visual records of voters or their 
vehicles; or issue literature 
outlining the fact that voter fraud 
is a crime or detailing the 
penalties under any state or 
federal statute for impermissibly 
casting a ballot. 
Democratic Nat’l Comm., 671 F. Supp. 2d at 622–23. 
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maintaining adherence to fulfillment of the Decree’s purpose.  
The District Court’s modification is suitably tailored to 
resolve the prior ambiguity and does not strive to conform to 
the constitutional floor by allowing the RNC to engage in all 
activities without preclearance.  See Rufo, 502 U.S. at 391.  
The modification clarifies the previous ambiguity.   
The District Court agreed with the RNC that the lack 
of an expiration date in the Decree was “inherently 
inequitable.”  Democratic Nat’l Comm., 671 F. Supp. 2d at 
621.  The District Court modified the Decree by adding an 
eight-year expiration date, December 1, 2017, and allowing 
for an extension of the Decree for another eight years if the 
DNC proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
RNC has violated the Decree.  The RNC argues that the 
District Court’s December 1, 2017 expiration date is an abuse 
of discretion and that the appropriate Decree termination date 
is either eight years after the parties entered into the Decree in 
1982, eight years after the Decree’s modification in 1987, or, 
at worst, eight years after the Malone litigation.   
Although a considerable number of years have passed 
since the RNC and DNC agreed to the Decree in 1982 and 
1987, the parties entered the Decree voluntarily and for over a 
quarter of a century neither party objected to the duration of 
the Decree.  The District Court did not abuse its discretion by 
declining to vacate the Decree due to the length of time since 
its entry.  See BCTC, 64 F.3d at 889 (declining to hold that 
“the mere passage of time” is itself “sufficient to constitute 
the type of changed circumstances that warrant lifting of an 
injunction”).  Thus, it does not follow that the original 
decision not to include an expiration date requires vacatur 
now that the Decree has an expiration date.   
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The District Court noted that it was imposing a 
termination date of eight years from its ruling because the 
Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice, which is 
charged with enforcing the Voting Rights Act, also imposes 
consent decrees with time limits of eight years, which can be 
extended for good cause.  The RNC has not shown that the 
District Court’s decision to set a termination date of eight 
years from the date of its order modifying the Decree with 
provisions allowing for an extension of that termination date 
for good cause is “arbitrary, fanciful or clearly unreasonable.”  
Moyer, 473 F.3d at 542.   
By adding an eight-year expiration date, December 1, 
2017, to the Decree, the District Court modified the Decree to 
remedy the inequity that it perceived to be caused by the lack 
of expiration date.26
                                                 
26 Neither party argued before this Court that the District 
Court abused its discretion by imposing a formerly non-
existent time limitation on the RNC’s obligations under the 
Decree, thereby relieving the RNC of its burden to show a 
significant change of fact or law to secure release from those 
obligations.  Thus, this issue is not before this Court and we, 
accordingly, do not decide it.  The District Court decided to 
impose that time limitation based on a hypothetical situation 
that it speculated might well occur in the future.  The District 
Court held as follows with respect to this matter: 
  Accepting arguendo that the Decree 
 
The final consideration weighing 
in favor of modification involves 
the fact that the Consent Decree 
does not include a date on which 
the obligations it imposes on the 
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RNC will terminate.  In failing to 
include such an expiration date, 
the parties have created a situation 
in which the RNC is, at least 
nominally, bound by those 
obligations in perpetuity, 
regardless of whether it continues 
to engage in voter suppression 
efforts or has any incentive to do 
so.  That situation is inherently 
inequitable.  For example, if at 
any point in the future the RNC 
succeeds in attracting minority 
voters in such numbers that its 
candidates receive the majority of 
votes cast by those populations, it 
will have no incentive to engage 
in anti-fraud measures that have 
the effect of deterring those voters 
from casting their ballots.  Under 
the Consent Decree as currently 
written, though, the RNC would 
be required to pre-clear any such 
measures with this Court, while 
the DNC would be free to 
implement ballot security 
programs without doing so.  In an 
effort to avoid similar situations, 
the Civil Rights Division of the 
DOJ—the government entity 
charged with enforcing the 
VRA—imposes a time limit of 
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without a time limit is “inherently inequitable,” the provision 
allowing for an extension of the Decree for another eight 
years if the DNC proves by a preponderance of the evidence 
the RNC has violated the Decree preserves the purpose of the 
                                                                                                             
eight years on its consent decrees, 
which may be extended for good 
cause. . . . The Court believes that 
such a provision is justified in this 
case. 
 
Democratic Nat’l Comm., 671 F. Supp. 2d at 621-22. 
 
 This Court draws attention to this issue only to make 
clear that we have not resolved it by implication or otherwise.  
It is at least doubtful that a district court could decide to 
impose a time limitation within the bounds of its appropriate 
discretion while simultaneously concluding that the RNC 
retained an incentive to violate the Consent Decree and had 
shown no other existing and relevant change of circumstance.  
Passage of time alone is not normally regarded as a 
significant change of fact.  Building and Const. Trades v. 
NLRB, 64 F.3d 880, 889 (3d Cir. 1995) (“[W]e are unwilling 
to hold, and BCTC cites no persuasive authority to the 
contrary, that the mere passage of time and temporary 
compliance are themselves sufficient to constitute the type of 
changed circumstances that warrant lifting an injunction.”).  
Moreover, given that the obligations of a consent decree are 
necessarily subject to the limitations of Rule 60(b)(5) and 
terminable whenever prospective application would no longer 
be equitable, the District Court’s characterization of the 
RNC’s situation as “inherently inequitable” also seems 
questionable. 
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Decree so that the modification does not rewrite the consent 
order more than equity requires.  Moreover, we do not adopt 
the RNC’s argument that the District Court abused its 
discretion by not starting the eight year period from the date 
of the entry of the Decree or from its 1987 modification, 
“thus requiring . . . immediate vacatur.”  (Appellant’s Br. 42.)  
The District Court concluded, with ample record support, that 
the purpose of the Decree had not yet been fulfilled and 
vacatur would not have been suitably tailored to its findings.   
The RNC has not established by a preponderance of 
the evidence that any workability issues remaining after the 
District Court’s modification are so acute that prospective 
application of the Decree is inequitable.  The District Court 
did not abuse its discretion by declining to vacate due to 
workability.   
The RNC has not established that any of the District 
Court’s decisions were “arbitrary, fanciful or clearly 
unreasonable.”  Moyer, 473 F.3d at 542.  Thus, the District 
Court did not abuse its discretion by holding that the RNC did 
not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that any of 
the following four Rufo factors necessitated vacatur or 
modifications beyond those ordered by the District Court: (1) 
a significant change in factual conditions; (2) a significant 
change in law; (3) that “a decree proves to be unworkable 
because of unforeseen obstacles”; or (4) that “enforcement of 
the decree without modification would be detrimental to the 
public interest.”  Rufo, 502 U.S. at 384.  Furthermore, the 
District Court’s modifications were suitably tailored to the 
changed workability circumstances. 
3. BCTC Factors 
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  We noted in BCTC that  a court determining whether 
to vacate or modify a decree should respond to the specific set 
of circumstances before it by considering factors unique to 
the conditions of the case.  BCTC, 64 F.3d at 888.  The 
factors raised in the District Court that are unique to the 
circumstances of this case are whether the RNC has complied 
or attempted to comply in good faith with the terms of the 
Decree and the likelihood that the conduct sought to be 
prevented will recur absent the Decree.  For any change to 
justify vacatur, it must be a significant change, rendering the 
prospective application of the Decree inequitable.  See 
BCTC, 64 F.3d at 886. 
The RNC claims that it has complied with the Decree 
since 1987 and that it is highly unlikely that the RNC will 
attempt to intimidate or suppress minority voters in the future 
if the Decree is vacated.  The District Court did not abuse its 
discretion or err by considering the Malone finding that, in 
2004, the RNC engaged in substantive and procedural 
violations of the Decree.  Although the panel’s decision was 
vacated as moot by this Court sitting en banc, that vacatur did 
not disturb the panel’s factual determination that the RNC had 
violated the Decree.  Furthermore, the District Court did not 
rely on Malone’s preliminary injunction as precedent, but, 
instead, merely considered its finding of fact regarding the 
Decree violation as instructive regarding the RNC’s level of 
compliance with the Decree.27
                                                 
27 Because the District Court is not using the Malone 
judgment to “spawn[] any legal consequences” and the 
Court’s consideration of the findings of fact has no impact on 
“relitigation of the issues between the parties,” United States 
v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36 (1950), is inapposite.  Id. 
   
 57 
                                                                                                             
at 39–41 (holding that the practice for dealing with a 
judgment that “has become moot while on its way [to the 
Supreme Court] or pending [the Supreme Court’s] decision 
on the merits is to reverse or vacate the judgment below and 
remand with a direction to dismiss”). 
 The RNC insists that the District Court’s 2004 
decision in the Malone proceeding has no “precedential 
effect.”  Here, however, the District Court did not give 
“precedential effect” to the judgment in another case.  The 
issue of whether the RNC had violated the consent decree in 
Malone’s situation was litigated before the District Court in 
this case and all of the evidence submitted by the parties with 
respect to that issue remains part of the record in this case.  
The Court referred to its factual finding of a consent decree 
violation in the Malone proceeding in response to the RNC’s 
attempt to carry its burden by relying on the results in the 
enforcement litigation that had occurred since 1982.  
According to the RNC, the “slim record of enforcement 
success against the RNC demonstrates that it has strictly 
complied with the Consent Decree since 1987, and there is no 
evidence to suggest that its behavior will change if the Decree 
is vacated.”  RNC Proposed Conclusions of Law, App. at 
1264.  In this context, the Court did not err in referring to and 
relying upon its factual finding of a 2004 violation in the 
Malone proceeding.  Contrary to the RNC’s suggestion, it 
was clearly not surprised by the District Court’s response to 
its argument.  Evidence from the Malone proceeding was 
discussed by the witnesses at the evidentiary hearing and in 
the ensuing briefing of the parties.  See, e.g., App. at 1081-82, 
1234-35.   
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Furthermore, the RNC’s position regarding Malone is 
contradictory.  For purposes of determining RNC’s 
compliance with the Decree, the RNC argues that the Court 
should not consider Malone in any way.  However, for 
purposes of determining from which point the eight-year 
Decree expiration date should begin to run, the RNC has 
mentioned that the 2004 Malone decision could be an 
appropriate starting point.  Even if the RNC had not violated 
the Decree since 1987, that fact alone is not necessarily 
sufficient to justify vacating the Decree because compliance 
is the purpose of the Decree.  See BCTC, 64 F.3d at 889 
(declining to hold that “temporary compliance” is itself 
“sufficient to constitute the type of changed circumstances 
that warrant lifting of an injunction”).  As the District Court 
noted, any past compliance might have been “because the 
Decree itself has deterred such behavior.”  Democratic Nat’l 
Comm., 671 F. Supp. 2d at 601.   
Additionally, the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion by finding that the RNC had not produced evidence 
demonstrating a lack of incentive for the RNC to engage in 
voter suppression and intimidation.  The racial and ethnic 
background of this nation’s political leadership, the RNC’s 
leadership, and the electorate do not decrease the likelihood 
that the RNC will suppress minority voters such that 
prospective application of the Decree is inequitable.  If the 
RNC does not hope to engage in conduct that would violate 
the Decree, it is puzzling that the RNC is pursuing vacatur so 
vigorously notwithstanding the District Court’s significant 
modifications to the Decree.   
The RNC’s decision not to engage in normal poll-
watch functions or obtain preclearance for voter fraud 
security programs does not allow us to assume past or future 
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compliance.  On the contrary, the RNC’s refusal to engage in 
normal poll-watch functions or to obtain preclearance may be 
because the RNC, as it has argued, is not sure of the 
difference between normal poll-watch functions and voter 
fraud security programs.  That the RNC has not engaged in a 
normal poll-watch function and has not presented a request 
for preclearance of a voter fraud security program that does 
not disproportionately target minority voters leaves open the 
possibility that the RNC, absent enforcement of the Decree, 
would not comply with the Decree terms in the future.  See 
BCTC, 64 F.3d at 890 (noting that a party deciding “not to 
picket at all” does not “show that [the party] has in fact 
learned how to picket without treading on the prohibitions 
against secondary boycott contained both in the law and the 
various negotiated consent decrees”). 
In light of the District Court’s modifications, the RNC 
does not point to any significant change that renders 
prospective application of the Decree inequitable.  The 
District Court did not abuse its discretion by declining to 
vacate or modify the Decree because of BCTC factors.      
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the 
judgment of the District Court. 
